I. Introduction
The 34 days of intense fighting which took place between Hezbollah on the one hand and Israel on the other during the summer of 2006, now commonly referred to as the "Second Lebanon War", 1 raised not only political, but also significant, and to a large extent yet unresolved, fundamental legal issues of both, jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 2 More specifically, given the circumstances and realities of the armed conflict as it unfolded, one has to address in particular 3 issues of proportionality with regard to both jus ad bellum, i.e. questions of the prohibition of the use of force under international law and possible exceptions thereto, and questions of the scope and possible limits of the right to selfdefense under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 4 as well as questions of proportionality within the context of jus in bello, namely in relation to the causation of civilian damages when attacking military objects. 5 Before doing so, it has to be noted, however, that many factual questions concerning the "Second Lebanon War" remain open and will most probably do so for a significant period of time, if not forever. This is the case notwithstanding the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon established by the Human Rights Council of the United Nations 6 on the occasion of its second special session on 11 August 2006. 22 -23 2007, available at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selectedtopics/Humanitarian-efforts/The-Norwegian-Governments-initiative-for/ conference.html?id=449312>. As to the follow-up conference held in Lima from May 23-25, 2007 cf. <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/25/global 16006.htm>. As of today, the legality of the use of cluster munitions would depend on the way they are used, i.e. whether they are exclusively used against larger concentration of members of the enemy armed forces (in which case their use is not prohibited by international humanitarian law) or rather in circumstances where their use can (or even necessarily would) lead to prohibited excessive incidental damage to civilians or civilian objects.
Still the report, delivered on 23 November 2006, 7 had in any case to deal only with alleged violations of Israel against international law. 8 It follows therefore that any evaluation of legal issues arising under applicable norms of international humanitarian law is somewhat hampered. This is particularly true, inter alia, with regard to the attack on military objects within or in the vicinity of civilian settlements. It is against this background that the following considerations will almost exclusively focus on legal issues stricto senso.
Before considering issues of international humanitarian law, one has to first consider whether the use of force by Israel as such was justified under international law and, in particular under the Charter of the United Nations. 7 Cf. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1, Doc. A/HRC/3/2 of 23 November 2006, available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/ CoILebanon.pdf>. 8 Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1 had already determined in its operative para. 1, notwithstanding the outcome of the report of the Commission of Inquiry that was about to be set up by this very resolution, that Israel had committed breaches of international humanitarian law in Lebanon. It is also worth noting that the very same resolution in its operative para. 7 had deliberately decided to limit the focus of the Commission both ratione personae and ratione loci to, "(a) (…) investigate the systematic targeting and killings of civilians by Israel in Lebanon, (…) (b) [t] o examine the types of weapons used by Israel and their conformity with international law; [and finally] (c) [t] o assess the extent and deadly impact of Israeli attacks on human life, property, critical infrastructure and the environment", (emphasis added), thus per se excluding any investigation of possible violations of international humanitarian law by Hezbollah. The Human Rights Council was criticized for this approach by the Commission of Inquiry which stated that said mandate, "does not allow for a full examination of all of the aspects of the conflict, nor does it permit consideration of the conduct of all parties" (emphasis in the original), cf. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, ibid., para. 10. Cf. also paras 14-15 of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry.
II. The Second Lebanon War, the Prohibition of the Use
of Force and the Exercise of the Right to Self-Defense
Factual Background
The conflict began after Hezbollah had fired a series of Katyusha rockets and mortars at Israeli border villages. 9 At the same time, another armed Hezbollah unit crossed the Lebanese-Israeli border, kidnapping two Israeli soldiers and killing three other members of the Israeli armed forces. 10 Israeli troops attempted to rescue the abducted soldiers, but were unsuccessful, whereby five more members of the Israeli army were killed. 11 This raises the question which possible justifications might be relevant when considering the legality of the acts of Israel for the purposes of jus ad bellum.
Possible Justifications for the Use of Military Force by Israel
There is no doubt that the use of military force by Israel against Lebanon was not authorized by the Security Council. Besides, armed reprisals, or to use the more recent terminology used by the ILC in its Arti- This approach raises the issue of the existence of a "grey zone" of such military acts, which on the one hand are prohibited by virtue of Article 2 para. 4 of the Charter, but which at the same time do not yet trigger the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. 26 Regarding the "Second Lebanon War", there is no need to tackle that issue in detail, however, since the acts under consideration had, even when using the standard set out by the ICJ, 27 reached the level of intensity amounting to an armed attack. 24 The Court stated, "The Court does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the 'inherent right of self-defence'"(para. 72). Inter alia, it is not disputed there had been rocket attacks on Israeli territory from late 2005 until mid 2006 during which several people were killed. 28 On 12 July 2006, several Israeli soldiers were killed on Israeli territory by Hezbollah fighters, while two others were hijacked and taken into Lebanese territory. 29 At least when taken together, there seems to be no doubt that these acts involving both relatively largescale and protracted cross-border shelling and incursions into the territory of another state, did amount to an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, as defined by the above-mentioned jurisprudence of the ICJ. 30 It is doubtful, however, whether such an attack must be attributable to another "state" in order to trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, or whether instead this right of self-defense also comes into play in a case of armed attacks attributable to non-state entities such as Hezbollah. 31 This question would, however, be irrelevant provided the attacks undertaken by Hezbollah could under general international law be attributed to the state of Lebanon, anyway. It is therefore this question of attributability that must be tackled first. bility, since this would not only somewhat similarly require an empowerment by virtue of the law of the state concerned, i.e. Lebanon, but furthermore also require that the specific acts were undertaken in such capacity. 39 Since the Lebanese government had neither empowered Hezbollah to exercise governmental authority, nor still less to undertake military action on its behalf, the acts of Hezbollah may not be attributed by virtue of article 5 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
Attributability of the Acts of Hezbollah

c. Attribution of the Acts of Hezbollah as de facto Organs of Lebanon (Article 4 ILC Articles on State Responsibility)
Notwithstanding the fact that Hezbollah does not qualify as a de jure organ of Lebanon, 40 the military attacks undertaken by Hezbollah fighters against Israel might nevertheless be attributed to Lebanon, provided they could be considered to have acted as de facto organs of Lebanon. As the ICJ had already stated, however, in the Nicaragua case 41 and most recently reconfirmed in the Genocide case, 42 such attribution would presuppose not only a complete dependence by the respective group, 43 lacking any real autonomy of its own, 44 so that it could be considered a mere instrument or agent of the state concerned, 45 but also a particularly great degree of control by the state involved. 46 Accordingly, any such qualification solely serves to cover an exceptional situation, 47 where the state could escape its otherwise existing international responsibility despite the alleged independence of the group being nothing but a pure fiction. 48 Yet, the very fact that the Security Council had frequently requested that Lebanon should exercise full control over its entire territory, and 39 ILC Commentary to article 5 para. 7 of its Articles on State Responsibility, see note 38. 40 Cf. under II. 4. a. 41 Nicaragua case, see note 20, para. 109/110. 42 Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 385. 43 Ibid., para. 110. 44 Ibid., para. 394. 45 Ibid., para. 392. 46 Ibid., para. 393. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., para. 392.
particularly those parts of its territory bordering Israel, 49 already demonstrates that Hezbollah could not be considered to have been subject to complete control by Lebanon. Besides, since even Israel itself had continuously claimed that third states such as Syria and Iran had supported Hezbollah, e.g. by the delivery of weapons, 50 shows that Hezbollah was not sufficiently dependent on Lebanon. Its acts could therefore not be attributed to Lebanon as constituting de facto organs. It was in 1986 in the Nicaragua case, that the ICJ had taken the position, however, that any such attribution by virtue of the principle now contained in article 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, which the Court considers to have also codified customary international law, 53 requires a so-called "effective control" over the groups or non-state entities concerned and their military or paramilitary operations. 54 Yet, unlike in the case of attribution under article 5 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, 55 there is no need to prove "complete" dependence of the group. 56 On the other hand, it was again in its Nicaragua judgment, that the ICJ had also stressed that, in order to attribute such acts emanating from irregular groups, the control by the state concerned must extend to specific individual acts. 57 In other words, a simple "overall control" would not be sufficient in order to bring about attribution of acts of non-state entities.
In sharp contrast thereto, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had in its own jurisprudence, both in relation to the somewhat different question of the qualification of an armed conflict as possessing an international or a non-international character, and with regard to the question of attribution for purposes of state responsibility, considered it to be sufficient that the state con- cerned was exercising "overall control" over the acts of the respective non-state group. 58 Notwithstanding, the ILC had in turn, in its own codification work on the law of state responsibility, however, followed the approach originally taken by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, as is demonstrated by the official commentary accompanying article 8 of the then Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 59 Most recently, the ICJ has once again reiterated its own strict view in its judgment of 26 February 2007 in the Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro). In particular, it underlined that this form of strict attributability does apply, as a matter of principle, to all various forms of illegal acts under international law. 60 It thus also applies to possible violations of the prohibition of the use of force and the undertaking of an armed attack within the meaning of Article 2 para. 4 respectively Article 51 of the UN Charter, unless there is proof of a divergent lex specialis. 61 More specifically, the ICJ has underlined that the rule contained in article 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility is to be considered as an extension of the general rule, under which states are, at least as a matter of principle, only responsible for acts of their 58 own organs. 62 Accordingly, it is necessary, that the organs of the state concerned are indeed in a position to direct the behavior of the nonstate actor, since otherwise the necessary nexus would no longer exist. 63 Following this line of argument so far consistently followed by the ICJ, it is probably true to say that the attacks by Hezbollah in June 2006 may not be attributed to the state of Lebanon, given both the degree of independence of Hezbollah and the lack of effective control Lebanon was exercising in the southern part of its own territory, including over Hezbollah fighters operating in the area. 64 Yet, even if one were to follow, be it only arguendo, the approach chosen by the ICTY in its Tadić line of jurisprudence, any attribution would still require, as the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY had stated, "overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of military operations." 65 Accordingly, there still would be serious doubts, as to whether one could consider that the authorities of Lebanon, considering the role of Hezbollah as a "state within the Lebanese state", had been in a position to exercise such overall control over the acts of Hezbollah. Thus, and in any event, at the time the Israeli military measures were taken against Lebanese territory, there was no armed attack which could be attributed to the state of Lebanon under traditional rules of state responsibility.
Still it follows the question, whether an armed attack emanating from a non-state actor, such as Hezbollah, nevertheless empowers the attacked state to exercise its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Exercise of the Right to Self-Defense Against Attacks
Emanating from Non-State Actors Consequently, the Court concluded that Article 51 of the Charter had no relevance in that case.
Hereby the Court continued a line of jurisprudence which it had started, be it only implicitly, in 2003 in its judgment in the Oil Platforms case. 68 In said judgment, the Court had considered that the United States, in order to be able to rely on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations vis-à-vis attacks on ships occurring in the Persian Gulf, must at least claim to be the victim of attacks which are attributable to Iran, when stating that " [t] he United States has to show that attacks had been made upon it for which Iran was responsible." 69 In the meantime, the ICJ no longer seems to take a firm position on the matter anymore. Inter alia, it was in 2005 in the Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 70 that the Court expressly left it open whether, and if so under what conditions, contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces, i.e. non-state armed attacks. 71 In that regard, one must first take note of the fact that the very wording of Article 51 of the Charter does not contain any specific ref- 67 Ibid., para. 139 (emphasis added). 68 On the other hand, one could also argue that Article 51 of the UN Charter, providing for an exception from the general prohibition of the use of force as contained in Article 2 para. 4 of the Charter, has, in line with general principles of interpretation, to be interpreted restrictively. 75 Besides, subsequent state practice within the meaning of article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties relating to Article 51 of the UN Charter was, at least until the end of the last century, largely, if not almost exclusively, formed by the conviction that the right to selfdefense would and could only apply in cases of armed attacks emanating from or initiated by a state. 76 This state practice has, however, significantly changed since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Inter alia, both, S/RES/1368 (2001), as well as S/RES/1373 (2001), have confirmed the right to self-defense against those actors responsible for the attacks, without mentioning and indeed still less discussing, the question whether the attacks did indeed emanate from a state or not. The Security Council has thereby recognized the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense without making any reference to an armed attack which may be attributed to a state. 77 It is certainly not the least the Security Council and its practice which is, given its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN Charter, and further given the fact that Article 51 is to be found in "Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in SelfDefence" adopted by a group of British scholars in 2005 (for further details and the accompanying report cf. <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/index. php?id=79>): "Article 51 is not confined to self-defence in response to attacks by states. The right of self-defence applies also to attacks by non-state actors. In such a case the attack must be large scale. If the right of selfdefence in such a case is to be exercised in the territory of another state, it must be evident that that state is unable or unwilling to deal with the nonstate actors itself, and that it is necessary to use force from outside to deal with the threat in circumstances where the consent of the territorial state cannot be obtained. (footnote omitted) (...)". 75 Cf. for such a proposition e.g. M. Chapter VII of the UN Charter as an exception to Article 2 para. 4 of the Charter, relevant when considering and interpreting the content of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the prohibition of the use of force. 78 The same more liberal approach as to the possibility to act in selfdefense vis-à-vis a non-state armed attack is also mirrored in the reactions by a significant number of states, after 11 September 2001, within the framework of both NATO 79 and the OAS, 80 which serve as further examples of recent state practice and opinio juris allowing for selfdefense against armed attacks by non-state actors.
Yet, even if one were to take the position that measures of self-defense could not be taken against the aggressor in each and every case of armed attacks emanating from non-state actors (even provided they reach a sufficient level of intensity in order to constitute an armed attack 81 ), one would have to still recognize that at least under certain circumstances, as proven by the example of Afghanistan after 11 September 2001, different considerations must prevail.
In the case of Afghanistan, the Security Council had requested the Taliban regime not to use by themselves and not to allow territory under their control to be used for aggressive acts against other states. 82 It was after the Taliban regime had failed to do so that the Security Council adopted S/RES/1368 and 1373 (2001) measures of self-defense against the attacks of 11 September 2001. 83 This practice of the Security Council might be interpreted in the way, that the Security Council, by determining that a given situation did constitute a threat to the international peace and security 84 and by further requiring either a territorial state or an entity exercising de facto control over certain territory, to take certain actions, thereby provided for a specific norm of attribution, constituting a lex specialis, in case no such action is taken and further provided such territory is then used for acts by non-state actors constituting an armed attack against another state.
Such a situation where the Security Council had specifically requested a certain state to take action against a non-state group and not to have its territory used for hostile acts against another state is significantly different from a mere absence of action by the territorial state. In that regard, it is quite telling that the ICJ, when confronted in the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 85 with the claim that, "armed attacks by armed bands whose existence is tolerated by the territorial sovereign generate legal responsibility and therefore constitute armed attacks for the purpose of Article 51", leading to, 83 As was rightly pointed out by R. Wolfrum/ C.E. "a separate, a super-added standard of responsibility, according to which a failure to control the activities of armed bands, creates a susceptibility to action in self-defence by neighbouring States" 86 stated that it, "cannot conclude that the absence of action by Zaire's Government against the rebel groups in the border area is tantamount to 'tolerating' or 'acquiescing' in their activities." 87 It therefore, and rightfully so, rejected that part of Uganda's first counter-claim alleging Congolese responsibility for tolerating the rebel groups. 88 It follows that, as in the case of Afghanistan, the inaction by a territorial state which has been expressly requested by the Security Council to take action against armed groups operating from its territory against other states, does constitute a specific form of qualified inaction which in turn must enable states concerned, pending Security Council action under Chapter VII, to themselves exercise their right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.
This approach can, mutatis mutandis, be transposed to the situation between Israel and Lebanon as it existed after the shelling of Israeli dwellings by Hezbollah forces and the Hezbollah incursions into Israeli territory. As a matter of fact, the Security Council had, on several occasions, previously called upon Lebanon to fully extend and exercise its sole and effective authority throughout its own territory. More specifically, Lebanon had been called upon by the Security Council to prevent attacks from Lebanon across the so-called "Blue Line" into Israel. 89 The fact that the Security Council had with regard to Lebanon seems to be irrelevant. This is due to the fact that the non-action by Lebanon vis-à-vis relevant Security Council resolutions is solely taken as a factor in considering its behavior in deciding upon the question of attribution, but does not purport to endow Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VI with binding force.
On the whole, there therefore seems to be no doubt that Israel, at least as a matter of principle, was in a position to exercise its right of self-defense against the armed attacks emanating from Hezbollah, either because such attacks emanating from non-state actors do per se trigger the right to self-defense, or because of the specific situation Lebanon found itself in, with regard to relevant Security Council practice prior to the Israeli acts of self-defense.
One might wonder, however, whether Israel, when exercising its rights to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, was still acting within the limits prescribed by Article 51, and namely the principle of proportionality.
Self-Defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the Principle of Proportionality
There seems to be no dispute that the actions by a state exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter must abide by the principle of proportionality. 90 This requirement has also been referred to by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment. 91 It was later reconfirmed in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
The issue of proportionality is defined by the nature and the scope of the armed attack and the question, how the attack could, under the prevailing circumstances, be refuted. The This statement by the ICJ has to be interpreted in the sense that only those measures of self-defense are legitimate and legal under international law, which serve the overall goal to counter the armed attack. 93 In that regard much depends on the specific circumstances of the concrete situation and not least depends on the command and control structure of the aggressor. If there are military control centers located in the hinterland of the attacking state, they might be attacked in accordance with the principle of proportionality, even if the armed attack as such, which triggered the exercise of the right to self-defense in the first place, only originated from a limited territory adjacent to the territory of the attacked state.
On the other hand, the exercise of the right to self-defense must not be a mere motive for military sanctions, since otherwise the exercise of the right to self-defense would amount to nothing but hidden armed counter-measures, which, as was mentioned, 94 are illegal under international law. In particular, the actions allegedly taken in the exercise of the right to self-defense must, by their very nature, be able to diminish the military abilities of the aggressor and to induce the enemy not to continue its attack. 95 It is against this background that one has to take account of the determination of the ICJ of December 2005, which in the case between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, considered the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometers away from Uganda's border as not being proportionate within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 96 Yet, the longer the armed attack continues, the more measures of self-defense may then aim at the infrastructure of the aggressor, such as roads or oil refineries, provided it is only by such attacks that the aggressor can be prevented from continuing the attack or is forced to stop its attack. Finally, a further prerequisite relates to the fact that measures taken under Article 51 of the Charter must be also legal for purposes of jus ad bellum, i.e. must abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law. 98 This inter-linkage between jus ad bellum and jus in bello was unequivocally confirmed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, since in the view of the Court, any, "use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflicts which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law." 99 Reviewing the conflict as it unfolded between Israel and Hezbollah during the summer of 2006, it seems to be unproblematic for purposes of jus ad bellum, that Israel was exercising its right of self-defense, and that it particularly abided by the principle of proportionality, when it attacked military targets in southern Lebanon.
It might be more problematic, however, to reach the same conclusion when considering Israeli military measures taken far beyond southern Lebanon, given that the original armed attack by Hezbollah triggering the Israeli reply originated only in southern Lebanon. The legality of such measures of self-defense involving targets beyond southern Lebanon would, in view of the above considerations, depend on the answer to the question whether, and if so to what extent, command and control structures of Hezbollah were located in other parts of Lebanon, and especially in Beirut, from where the attacks of Hezbollah were coordinated or controlled.
Israel also argued at the time of the conflict and continues to do so, that weaponry had entered Lebanon via both, the airport of Beirut, and via roads from Syria. Assuming these allegations to be correct, they would lead to the legality of attacks on such objects at least for purposes of jus ad bellum. Yet, one might wonder, who carries the burden of proof in that regard. In order to increase the efficiency of the prohibition of the use of force, the ICJ had, in its judgment in the Oil Platforms case between the United States and Iran concerning U.S. attacks on Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf during the first Gulf 98 For further details as to the principle of proportionality as forming part of international humanitarian law cf. One might wonder whether this consideration should not also be applied, mutatis mutandis, with regard to the question of the proportionality of measures of self-defense. Otherwise, and similar to the burden of proof concerning the legality of the use of force as such, the danger of an escalation of military violence might significantly increase. Yet, one of the fundamental goals of Article 51 of the UN Charter, as demonstrated by Article 51, second phrase and the duty contained therein to inform the Security Council about measures taken in the exercise of the right to self-defense, is an attempt to, as far as possible, limit the unilateral use of military force.
On the other hand, an argument could also be raised as to whether the state which is exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, as being exposed to the threat of an ongoing or imminent armed attack, should not be granted a somewhat lowered standard of proof. In line with a parallel rule applicable for purposes of jus in bello concerning the legality of attacking objects, the civilian status of which is doubtful, 102 it seems plausible to argue that the relevant standard is that of the person, who was responsible for the specific planning, decision-making and taking of actions in self-defense, taking into consideration the information that was available ex ante.
It would accordingly be sufficient, in order for the reply to the armed attack to be considered legal under international law, that a bona fide claim could be made, that it could have ex ante been expected that the measures of self-defense, given the available information, would be proportionate in light of the anticipated armed attack.
As was mentioned before, 103 military actions in self-defense must, in order to be legal under international law, also abide by applicable norms of humanitarian law. It is against this background, that one must now address the issue of possible violations, by Israel, of relevant rules of international humanitarian law. This, however, first of all, requires a qualification of the conflict in order to be able to determine which rules were applicable, i.e. requires a determination whether the "Second Lebanon War" should indeed be qualified as an international armed conflict.
III. The Second Lebanon War and International
Humanitarian Law
Yet, at least when, as was undoubtedly the case during the "Second Lebanon War" of 2006, one state uses military means on the territory of another state, the rules of international armed conflicts do apply even if the "real" enemy in the conflict is not the territorial state as such, but rather a non-state group operating on and from the territory of said territorial state. 108 This conclusion can inter alia be based on an argumentum a fortiori to common article 2 para. 2 of the Four Geneva Conventions. Under this provision the four Geneva Conventions do apply even where in case of an occupation, the occupying power is not encountering armed resistance. If, therefore, norms of international humanitarian law, applicable to international armed conflicts, do apply in all types of occupation, even if no resistance takes place, this must be even more true where, as was clearly the case in Lebanon, military operations meet significant resistance, be it only by non-state armed groups. 109 Besides, the issue how to qualify the "Second Lebanon War" for purposes of jus in bello is of a somewhat limited relevance. This is due, first, to the fact that, while Israel is a contracting party to the Four Geneva Conventions 110 it is not a contracting party to the First Additional Protocol of 1977. 111 Yet, it is only this latter Protocol that contains express regulations dealing with the issue of proportionality. 112 It follows that in order to determine whether a given military operation was proportionate or not, one has to rely on applicable norms of customary international law, to the extent that they are binding upon Israel.
Moreover, it must also be noted that the norms of customary international law applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts concerning means and measures of warfare that can be legitimately used during an armed conflict, seem increasingly to merge. 113 It is true that, as far as the Rome Statute of the ICC is concerned, the crime of causing excessive collateral damage only applies in an international armed conflict setting. 114 Yet, the Rome Statute is, at least in that regard, not fully in line with modern customary international law. 115 Moreover said norm, as contained in the Rome Statute, solely covers the issue of individual criminal responsibility for the causation of excessive damage to civilians or civilian objects. 116 This, therefore, does not preclude that a more far-reaching prohibition does indeed exist under customary international law for purposes of state responsibility. 117 The general nature and applicability of the principle of proportionality in every kind of armed conflicts, be they of an international or a non-international nature, has, besides, been confirmed by the jurispru- 117 Cf. for a similar proposition distinguishing attribution for purposes of state responsibility from involvement of a third state in a military conflict in order to internationalize the conflict the judgment of the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide case, see note 14, para. 405, where the Court stated, "It should first be observed that logic does not require the same test to be adopted in resolving the two issues, which are very different in nature: the degree and nature of a State's involvement in an armed conflict on another State's territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as international, can very well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of involvement required to give rise to that State's responsibility for a specific act committed in the course of the conflict."
dence of the ICTY, 118 as well as by relevant state practice. 119 This led the International Committee of the Red Cross in its customary law study to the conclusion that the principle of proportionality indeed equally applies to both, international and non-international armed conflicts.
It is against this background that the issue of proportionality shall now be considered with regard to the "Second Lebanon War" regardless of a definite characterization of the armed conflict.
The Second Lebanon War and Possible Violations of the Principle of Proportionality a. Customary Law Nature and Content of the Principle of Proportionality as Part of International Humanitarian Law
The principle of proportionality, as a limit for military attacks, is enshrined in particular in article 51 para. 5 lit. b) of the First Additional Protocol to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1977 according to which, "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated", is prohibited. It seems to be generally recognized, that the content of this norm is generally accepted to form part of customary international law. While it is true that Israel itself is not a contracting party to the First Additional Protocol and therefore not bound by the said provision as a matter of treaty law, it must be noted that this rejection of the protocol is not due to the principle contained in article 51 para. 5 lit. b.) of the Protocol. 121 Even if one were to generally consider Israel as a persistent objector 122 vis-à-vis the development of customary international law as enshrined in the First Additional Protocol of 1977, 123 this would not hold true for the principle of proportionality.
On the one hand, Israel has lost its status as a persistent objector at least with regard to those parts of the First Additional Protocol which, like the principle of proportionality, have found their way into the Rome Statute of the ICC, 124 which Israel at least at a certain point had signed, 125 before it later indicated its intention not to ratify the Rome Statute. 126 On the other hand, it is Israel itself that maintains that the principle of proportionality does apply in armed conflicts. Inter alia, the official manual on the law of war of the Israeli Defense Forces provides that the commander shall not go ahead with an attack if it is to be anticipated that the damage to the civilian population would be excessive as compared to the anticipated military advantage. 127 When considering the issue of proportionality, one might wonder, however, what is the relevant military advantage to be balanced against the ensuing damage to civilians or civilian objects. The study undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross on the current status of customary international law in the field of international humanitarian law 128 in that regard simply repeats the formula contained in article 51 para. If one was to now, following the International Committee of the Red Cross and its customary law study, consider that customary international law does not take account of the advantage of the attack taken as a whole, but that one had to rather consider the specific attack as such and the specific advantage resulting there from, one would wonder, whether those states which had made the above mentioned declarations were now, and if so since when, bound by this new, stricter rule of customary international law. Furthermore, it must also be noted, that article 8 para. 2 lit. b) iv) of the Statute of the ICC, in turn, does criminalize such attacks only, when committed in the knowledge, "(…) that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated (…)". 130 In this context, it is particularly interesting to take note of the elements of crimes adopted by the contracting parties of the Rome Stat-ute, 131 which hint at the fact that the military advantage anticipated "may or may not be temporally or geographically related to the object of the attack". 132 It is against that background that at least under customary international law, when considering the proportionality of a given attack, the anticipated military advantage of the attack as a whole has to be kept in mind and taken into account.
Yet in any case, and first and foremost, the attack must be directed against a legitimate military target. Otherwise, i.e. when the attack is not directed against such a legitimate military target, the attack would per se be illegal under applicable norms of international humanitarian law. This, therefore, raises the question what constitutes a legitimate military target.
b. Notion of Military Targets
A generally accepted 133 definition of what constitutes a military target is to be found in article 52 para. 2 of the First Additional Protocol. Under said provision, in order to qualify as a military target, it is decisive whether these are objects, "which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."
In that regard one must take account of the fact, however, that an object does not loose its status as a military object, simply due to the fact that in such an object or in the vicinity of such an object, protected persons, and in particular, civilians are to found. 134 This is particularly true in situations where the enemy deliberately stations military objects or installations in the vicinity of, or even within civilian installations, or close to a civilian population. 135 At the end of the day, the qualification of a specific object as a military or non-military one depends on the specific circumstances prevailing at the time of the attack, its use, as well as the general structure of the conflict. It is against this background that some specific issues will now be dealt with.
With regard to considering roads and bridges in southern Lebanon destroyed by Israeli attacks, 136 one may argue that they are to be considered legitimate objects, provided that those roads and bridges were actually used or could have been used for the transport of The same is true for private homes in southern Lebanon, but also in Beirut and other cities, as far as and as long as they were used for military purposes by Hezbollah as such or by Hezbollah fighters, be it as launching pads for missiles or for the setting-up of command and control installations, which allegedly happened not infrequently.
It seems to be more problematic, however, to also qualify roads in the Lebanese hinterland as legitimate military targets. This could only be done if, on the basis of reliable information, Israel could have taken the position that those roads had then been used in order to transport logistics and ammunition, e.g. from Syria, via those roads towards Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for the airport of Beirut, the runways of which had been bombarded by the Israeli defense forces provided they were used for such military purposes. 139 Somewhat similarly, the attack on the TV installation Al Manar run by Hezbollah in Beirut, 140 may only be considered a legitimate attack on a military object provided it was not only used for propaganda purposes but, at the same time, was used as a so-called "dual-use" installation for both, civilian and military purposes, and especially if the telecommunication installations contained therein were used in order to coordinate military attacks by Hezbollah. On the other hand, and in line with the final report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 141 one must take the position that the sole fact that a mass medium was or is used for war propaganda does not per se make it a legitimate military target. 142 Even more problematic, keeping this result in mind, are obviously attacks on other, state-run Lebanese TV stations which, as far as can be discerned, were not connected to Hezbollah activities, whether of a military or a non-military nature. 139 For such allegation, see note 136. 140 Particularly problematic in light of applicable rules of international humanitarian law, given the very nature of the specific conflict here under consideration and further given the command and control structure of Hezbollah, seem to be attacks on other infrastructure installations of Lebanon, namely water and electricity installations. This applies particularly to those facilities which were not located in the immediate combat-zone of southern Lebanon since any such attacks, even if successful, would not bring about a definite military advantage, as required by article 52 para. 2 of the First Additional Protocol to the Four Geneva Conventions and parallel norms of customary international law. 143 Similar considerations do apply with regard to attacks on oil refineries or oil deposits, where once again the question arises, whether their destruction could have brought about a definite military advantage in light of the decentralized structure of Hezbollah, which therefore does not seem, or if so only to a very small degree, to have been dependent on transportation. This could eventually lead to the result that such attacks on oil refineries did not constitute attacks on legitimate military targets. Otherwise, those installations would indeed constitute legitimate military targets, provided they were subject to control of Hezbollah and were located in southern Lebanon, in which case it seems that their destruction could have brought about, at least from the ex ante viewpoint of a reasonable military commander, 144 a definite military advantage.
It is against this classification of various groups of objects as military or non-military objects, that one must now consider the issue of proportionality in a strict sense, i.e. the relationship between the military advantage anticipated and the ensuing civilian damages.
c. Weighing Military Advantages and Civilian Damages
An attack upon a military target is to be considered illegal under applicable norms of international humanitarian law, if, upon weighing the anticipated civilian damages, the attack is to be regarded as excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. This leads, however, as is indeed acknowledged in the authoritative ICRC Commentary on article 51 of the First Additional Protocol, to significant value judg-ments. 145 More specifically this raises the problem to evaluate a given anticipated military advantage as compared to ensuing collateral damage to either civilians or civilian objects or both.
One has to bear in mind, be it only with a heavy heart, that even causing the death of civilians as collateral damage as the result of an attack against a legitimate military object does not render the attack per se illegal under current rules of international humanitarian law. 146 It was the office of the prosecutor of the ICTY that took the position in that regard, that there exists a grey zone in which one may not yet determine that a violation of the principle of proportionality has indeed occurred. 147 In the Kupreskic case, a trial chamber of the ICTY took the position that a multitude of such "grey zone" cases could lead to the assumption, that the overall attacks under consideration could then, when taken as a whole, violate the principle of proportionality, as applicable under customary international law. 148 It specifically stated that, overall violation of international law. 150 One should therefore rather understand the judgment in the sense, that one has to take into account, when deciding upon the issue of proportionality, the general context of multiple attacks and the military advantages gained there from and weigh them with the civilian collateral damage caused by the whole set of military attacks. 151 In order to now decide upon the proportionality of the Israeli attacks during the "Second Lebanon War" in light of these considerations, however, one would have to undertake an intensive verification of the relevant facts on the ground as they existed at the time of the individual attacks. 154 in its report reached the conclusion that Israeli troops had committed significant violations of the principle of proportionality. 155 In particular, the Commission of Inquiry took note of attacks which had taken place not in southern Lebanon, but rather in Lebanon's northern part and, in particular, in the Beirut area. In this regard one must, however, consider that Israel did not cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry, which quite obviously led to the consequence that at least to a certain extent, relevant information was not available. The background of this noncooperation by Israel was, inter alia, the already mentioned fact 156 In paras 111 and 112 of its report, 160 the Commission of Inquiry describes repeated attacks by Israeli forces against a small southern Lebanese town located only a few hundred meters north of the Israeli border. This town had been the scene of intensive combats ever since the beginning of the conflict. Frequently, missiles had been fired into Northern Israeli cities from this location. 161 Despite repeated attempts by Israeli forces to conquer the town, Hezbollah fighters stationed in the village were successful in preventing Israeli troops from gaining control over the village. Apart from approximately one hundred inhabitants, all of the 12,000 inhabitants of the town had left their homes due to Israeli warnings. 162 The Israeli armed forces had initially attempted to destroy the houses with bulldozers, and only after they had been unsuccessful in trying to do so, started shelling the town with artillery and the Israeli air force started flying air raids before each new attack. 163 Due to these shelling and bombardments more than 800 houses were completely and 400 houses were partially demolished.
Without even considering the number of Hezbollah fighters or the duration of the fighting within the town, the report of the Commission of Inquiry reached the somewhat blunt result that the attack was to be considered not to be proportionate and did thus constitute a violation of international humanitarian law. It is the view of this author that, in order to determine the proportionality or non-proportionality of the attack, one would have needed to gain access to much more specific information, including, but not limited to, the following issues, namely to 159 At the relevant time the following Eastern European states, apart from Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, were represented in the Human Rights Council: Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Ukraine, cf. <http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/groups.htm>. 160 See note 7. 161 As to the (alleged) number of missiles fired into Israel by Hezbollah on a daily basis cf. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel's War with Hezbollah -Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, see note 9, Appendix A. 162 Cf. in particular para. 111 of the report, see note 7. 163 Cf. in particular para. 112 of the report, see note 7.
what extent civilian houses and buildings had really been used for military purposes, to what extent the launching of missiles had taken place from such civilian installations, and whether they had, as was claimed by Israel, been equipped with military bunkers.
Moreover, the Commission of Inquiry should have made an effort to determine to what extent it would have been possible from the ex ante view point of a reasonable military commander, 164 to conquer the town without significantly increased risks for his own troops without air support or far-reaching and extensive artillery shelling.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Concluding, one might say that it is quite probable that violations of the principle of proportionality by Israeli armed forces have occurred. On the other hand Hezbollah from the very beginning of the conflict, considering its deliberate missile attacks on Northern Israeli cities which did constitute civilian objects, 165 made no attempt to abide by applicable norms of jus in bello. 166 At the end of the day, one might be therefore tempted to agree with the statement made by Knut Ipsen at the very beginning of the conflict, who had then stated:
"While Israel violates international law, Hezbollah completely disregards it from the very beginning." 167 Keeping this in mind one cannot but continue attempts to bring about increased respect for international humanitarian law in case future conflicts should arise.
